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Framing Christian Eschatology through Natural Teleology? Theological Possibilities 
and Concerns 
Mikael Leidenhag 
New College. University of Edinburgh. Mound 
Place. EH1 2LX. UK. 
mleidenh@ed.ac.uk. 
 
Christian theology typically maintains that God is transforming the universe into a New 
Creation. Christianity is significantly forward looking with its concern with the ‘last things’ 
and the final destinies of individual people, human history, and the cosmos as a whole.1 The 
history of the world is, therefore, interpreted in light of what will come. A theology of 
creation, given this eschatological understanding, entails a teleological view of nature moving 
towards a transcendent future that is revealed proleptically in Jesus Christ. In this way, 
evolutionary history is interpreted against the backdrop of eschatology, so that for 
Christianity purpose is a real feature of creation. As John Haught has suggested, creation is 
purposeful and teleological in that it is ‘orientated towards the implementation of something 
intrinsically good.’2 
 
Yet, the idea of teleology has come under attack by modern science and evolutionary biology 
in particular. It is argued that science with its emphasis on mechanistic explanations leaves no 
room for Aristotle’s ‘final cause’ and no intrinsic goal-directedness in nature. While 
teleological language often shows up in biological discourse, such language is generally seen 
as an unwanted legacy from the Christian tradition.3 In many cases, philosophers propose 
solutions relating to teleonomy, which suggests that natural laws bring about only the 
appearance of purpose. Notable thinkers persist in claiming that purpose in nature is mere 
illusion. Steven Weinberg famously argued that the increase in scientific knowledge meant 
the rejection of purpose: ‘The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also 
seems pointless.’4 William Provine follows this anti-purpose materialism, saying that 
‘Modern science directly implies that the world is organized strictly in accordance with 
deterministic principles or chance. . . There are no purposive principles whatsoever in 
nature.’5 There is neither direction nor progress within the biological world. As Stephen Jay 
Gould suggested, ‘progress is a noxious culturally embedded, untestable, nonoperational, 
intractable idea that must be replaced if we wish to understand the patterns of history.’6 For 
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Alex Rosenberg the message of science is ‘absolutely clear: no teleology, no purposes, goals, 
or ends.’7  
In this way, we have a clash, or at least some kind of conceptual tension, between an 
eschatological account of creation as progressing towards its ultimate fulfilment and a 
naturalistic understanding and even rejection of teleological phenomena. This paper will 
explore new accounts of teleology through Terrence Deacon, Stuart Kauffman, and Simon 
Conway Morris. They each propose a view of teleology as real, irreducible, and fully natural. 
In effect, these teleological accounts pave way for a post-reductionist ontology which 
Christian eschatology can dialogue with. This paper will explore the possibilities and 
concerns of articulating an eschatological account of creation through natural teleology. First, 
I will briefly explain the modern resistance to teleology within the biological world, and 
thereafter explicate Deacon’s, Kauffman’s, and Conway Morris’s natural teleology.  I will 
then explore the theological benefits of synthesising natural teleology with eschatology. The 
final section will pose some challenges for a theological accommodation of natural teleology 
and analyse the implications of eschatology for the issue of divine non-interventionism. My 
conclusion will be that although this proposed synthesis faces some theological issues, 
updated accounts of teleology provide conceptual and ontological resources for framing 
God’s ongoing eschatological transformation of creation. 
 
THE MODEST RETURN OF TELEOLOGY 
Teleological notions show up in both scientific and every-day discourses. We often say that 
we did so-and-so because we wanted to achieve this or that; or, we did X for the sake of Y.8 
Teleology, therefore, is commonly described as ‘the study of ends and goals, things whose 
existence or occurrence is purposive.’9 A teleological explanation, then, makes reference to 
causes that ‘can only be understood in terms of the future.’10 Despite being semantically 
prevalent, teleology (within biology) is met with scepticism and is usually accused of 
bringing in animism and supernaturalism through the back door.11 Because of this worry, 
scholars have taken on the challenge of explaining teleology through non-teleological 
categories. 
It should be noted that the project of reducing or eliminating teleological categories is a part 
of a greater ambition to cleanse biological discourse from the legacy of Aristotelian 
philosophy. Aristotle’s unapologetic account of teleology stated that actions, institutions, 
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industries, arts and different artefacts exist for some purpose.12 Such purposes, for Aristotle, 
depend on minds and on ‘agents aiming (or intending, designing, planning, etc.) for certain 
results.’13 Teleology, so conceived, implies a rejection of the robust Cartesian split between 
human and non-human animals by suggesting that some animals exhibit goal-directedness. 
The world is full of ‘purposeful striving, in which each of the four elements of the sublunary 
realm – earth, water, air and fire. . .’ strive towards its proper actualisation.14 Consequently, 
an organism’s intrinsic nature is ‘its path toward nature’, and its process of self-realization 
constitutes its identity.15 
 
There is widespread hermeneutical disagreement among scholars regarding the ontological 
status of teleology within Aristotelian metaphysics, but it seems as if a good case can be 
made that teleological phenomena are understood as sui generis; neither eliminable nor 
reducible to more basic physical categories. That is, ‘Aristotle is a nonreductive realist when 
it comes to teleology.’16 Sui generis teleology, however, has been vigorously resisted within 
modern biology, and has been viewed as an obstacle to scientific progress. As Richard 
Cameron points out, ‘central figures in the modern scientific revolution often disparaged 
Aristotelian science – including its invocations of teleology – in advancing their new 
theories.’17 Evolutionary biology, given its emphasis on causal-mechanistic explanations, is 
considered intrinsically post-Aristotelian. If it is possible to account for a phenomenon in a 
causal-mechanistic manner – i.e. by citing the relevant mechanisms that caused it – then we 
should in the spirit of Ockham shave away any superfluous teleological explanations.18  
This is what Charles Darwin delivered in Origin; the mechanism of natural selection, which 
is at the centre of evolutionary thinking and the framework of Neo-Darwinism. 
Acknowledged by Darwin was the fact that organisms seem as if designed and that particular 
adaptations give the impression of being teleological or end-directed. Such end-directedness, 
for many pre-evolutionists, seemed to indicate the presence and activity of a sovereign God. 
Darwin, however, ‘argued that natural selection, unaided, can do the job.’19 
 
I will now turn to some recent attempts to reintroduce natural teleology into evolutionary 
biology. Such updated accounts can be found in Terrence Deacon, Stuart Kauffman and 
Simon Conway Morris. I will, however, not provide an in depth exploration of each person’s 




Neuroanthropologist Terrence Deacon notes that ‘an immense logical chasm appears to exist 
between explanations given in terms of telos and explanations given in terms of the familiar 
pushes and pulls of physics and chemistry.’20 The debate regarding biological teleology is 
often reduced to two opposing extremes: either we eliminate teleology from the scientific 
image, or we give up and conclude that teleology is intrinsically mysterious and forever 
beyond human understanding. Deacon intends to go beyond these two views by proposing 
that teleology emerges naturally through the interaction of simple physical-chemical 
processes. He exemplifies this phenomenon with an autocell, a relatively simple molecular 
structure that is generated through the processes of autocatalytic cycle and a self-assembling 
capsule. The processes are mutually beneficial and it is the ‘synergistic relationship between 
processes that reciprocally support one another’s persistence.’21 It is, Deacon suggests, the 
‘systemic interdependence, or synergy, and not any component molecules or chemical 
reactions that is the defining property of an autocell.’22 But is this process an indication of 
purpose within the biological strata of reality? Deacon argues that the autocell demonstrates a 
view of teleology as produced by a process of co-dependence. That is, a ‘self-organizing 
process that collectively and synergistically constituted an autonomous, self-maintaining, 
self-reconstituting unit: a self that benefits its own persistence . . .’23 We get spontaneous 
end-directedness through self-organization, leading to the emergence of natural teleology.  
 
A similar emphasis on self-organization is expressed by bio-complexity theorist Stuart 
Kauffman. Humanity and the whole of nature, according to Kauffman, are the products of the 
twin sources of order, namely selection and self-organization.24 Kauffman argues that the 
resistance to teleology is a by-product of a reductionist account of nature, a view of the 
natural order that goes back to Descartes, Galileo, and Newton. A mechanistic account of 
nature leaves no room for teleological principles, and we are left with the view that all of 
reality ‘is nothing but whatever is “down there” at the current base of physics.’25 Instead, he 
suggests that the biosphere continuously gives rise to unpredictable phenomena, new 
properties, and new entities with novel capacities and powers. The biosphere is creative in 
ways that escape current computational capacities, and the ‘physicist cannot simulate the 
evolution of the specific biosphere...’26 
 
This non-reductionist picture of the becoming of the natural world, through the workings of 
organizational laws, permits the existence of irreducible agency and teleology. Teleology is 
not an anomaly, but something which belongs to the fundamental level of nature. The goal, 
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then, is to ‘identify the minimum natural system to which it makes sense to attribute 
teleological explanations.’27 Such a system should be able to, among other things, perform at 
least one work cycle, be individuated naturally, act on its own behalf and engage in self-
propagating work. This, argues Kauffman, can be seen in the behaviour of a bacterium; a 
bacterium swims up the glucose gradient ‘to get’ sugar.28 In this case, the bacterium is acting 
on its own behalf in its natural environment. Moreover, its behaviour entails teleological 
notions such as ‘detecting’, ‘choosing’, and ‘acting’. A bacterium, however, is in fact quite 
complex, and we must ask if it is possible to deduce teleology from even simpler systems. 
Kauffman proposes here the idea of ‘minimal molecular autonomous agents’. That is, very 
simple molecular systems which exhibit relative autonomy, engage in work cycles, 
reproduce, and have boundaries which allow for natural individuation.29 Based on the 
ontology of these molecular agents, we can say that teleology is a natural, yet irreducible, 
phenomenon. Moreover, it does not seem possible, according to Kauffman, to arrive at an 
adequate theory of how ‘organismic processes self-organize’ through ‘pure physical 
description alone’.30 This novel phenomenon of self-organization indicates the radical 
underdetermination of the biological by the physical, as well as the reality of teleological 
laws ‘that could apply to life universally.’31  
 
Conway Morris challenges the randomness view of evolution, or what he calls the 
evolutionary orthodoxy, which claims that ‘a creature is a contingent accident, assembled by 
chance histories and circumstances.’32 He argues instead that there are ‘preferred pathways’ 
in evolution. Evolutionary convergence shows that we live in a constrained world. As he 
writes, convergence shows that ‘at many levels evolution is seeded with probabilities, if not 
inevitabilities.’33 There is a direction to evolution, and the appearance of human beings is not 
due to random occurrence. Indeed, humans are inevitable. Evolution is not random, but 
‘strongly selection-constrained along certain pathways and to certain destinations.’34 The 
independent appearance of intelligence in evolutionary history, in organisms with markedly 
different biological makeup, seems to indicate teleology through convergence. The 
abundance of, in the biological world, ‘striking examples of convergence underpins that such 
features may well be evolutionarily inevitable. . .’ and that ‘all intelligences could tend 
towards a similar end point.’35      
 
Interestingly, Conway Morris does not merely suggest that the idea of convergence changes 
evolutionary science and our current conception of the biological world. He argues more 
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strongly that evolutionary convergence carries metaphysical implications and that ‘biology 
may be much closer to metaphysics than it often cares to acknowledge.’36 The fact of 
convergence in evolution could suggest that it is a purposeful process, that evolutionary 
biology ‘is the motor whereby the deeper realities of the universe may be uncovered...’37 
Indeed, in the end of Life’s Solution he argues that the phenomenon of convergence indicates 
that there are natural teleological laws at play in nature. In a similar way to Kauffman’s laws 
of self-organization, Conway Morris seeks through the model of convergence to explain the 
seeming evolutionary directionality toward increasing complexity and emergence of 
conscious creatures. He even suggests that the tendency toward the emergence of life is itself 
a cosmic principle. In this way, Conway Morris clearly takes his analysis of evolution in a 
metaphysical direction that allows for theological interpretation and analysis. As he remarks, 
‘Not only is the Universe strangely fit to purpose, but so, too. . . is life’s ability to navigate its 
solutions.’38 
We must ask ourselves, given the phenomenon of convergence, if the evolutionary worldview 
is compatible with, and perhaps even entails, a theological account of nature as Creation? 
Convergence and immanent teleology, Conway Morris argues, does not presuppose, ‘let 
alone proves, the existence of God, but all is congruent.’39  
 
Next section will analyse further the possible congruency between Christian eschatology and 
natural teleology, and in what ways teleological laws allow for theological reflection 
regarding the eschatological fulfilment of a ‘groaning’ creation (Romans 8:22). 
 
NATURE AS CREATION: NATURAL TELEOLOGY IN LIGHT OF 
ESCHATOLOGY 
In what ways can an updated account of biological teleology aid in formulating and filling 
out the ontological content of an integrative and realist eschatology? 40 A teleological account 
of biological processes, stressing the self-organizational, dynamic, and convergent dimension 
of the natural order, provides helpful resources for constructively explicating divine 
immanence and the role of the Spirit of bringing about the New Creation. Such display of 
immanent activity within the natural domain shows, moreover, that ‘God’s concerns are not 
limited to the human domain. Nothing less than the wider creation provides his palette. And 
the poured out Spirit is the brush that returns the color to the canvas.’41 On Deacon’s, 
Kauffman’s, and Conway Morris’s teleological accounts, the created order is continuously 
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progressing towards greater complexity, giving credence to an ontology of creation beyond 
the ‘nothing-buttery’ of Gould, Rosenberg, and Weinberg. Indeed, by situating such teleology 
within an eschatological context we can more fully understand how the earthly connects with 
the heavenly as portrayed in Isaiah 32:15-18 and 44:1-542, and how an unfinished creation is 
anticipating the full indwelling of its Creator (1 Corinthians 15); an event which is 
proleptically promised in the resurrection of Jesus Christ.43 Furthermore, by ontologically 
grounding a form of directedness in the natural it becomes possible to shed light on God’s 
creatio continua and the tranformatio mutandi, or renovatio, of physical reality; thus, holding 
together continuity and discontinuity of old and new creation. Such a vision of God’s 
ongoing creative activity coheres well with a theistic understanding of evolution, as 
formulated by Howard Van Till: ‘Drawing also from the vocabulary of the natural sciences, I 
envision a creation brought into being by God and gifted not only with a rich “potentiality 
space” of possible structures and forms, but also with the capacities for actualizing these 
potentialities by means of self-organization into nucleons, atoms, molecules, galaxies, 
nebulae, stars, planets, and the life-forms that inhabit at least one planet, perhaps more.’44 
However, one needs to be vary of fusing a teleological view of the Spirit’s activity, and 
God’s influence within evolutionary dynamics, with a naïve progressivism; the view that 
everything is progressively getting better. Creation is affected by sin. Death, pain, and sorrow 
came into this world through human disobedience and sinfulness. Hence, an eschatological 
engagement with teleology needs to be articulated in terms of cosmic renewal and 
redemption, and not reductive progressivism.45  
Continuing on the topic of theistic evolution, a further reason for bridging natural teleology 
with eschatology is that it can aid in making ontological and epistemological sense of the 
‘biblical picture of the “humility of God.”’46 Whether God can be ‘humble’ is debated among 
scholars47, but God’s incarnation in the Son and the Son’s death on the cross seem to indicate 
self-giving and, perhaps, self-limitation on God’s part.48 This theological theme has been 
explored by John Haught who argues that the messy world of Darwinian evolution is 
congruent with the kenotic ‘picture of an incarnate God who suffers along with creation. . .’49 
Theology, Haught argues, faces the important task to retrieve the image of a vulnerable God 
that refrains from interfering in the becoming of creation. It is here that it becomes relevant to 
think about creation’s becoming in terms of natural teleological laws, because if we conceive 
ultimate reality ‘fundamentally as self-emptying, suffering love, we should already anticipate 
that nature will give every appearance of being in some sense autonomously creative 
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(autopoietic).’50 Deacon’s, Kauffman’s and Conway Morris’s post-reductionist ontologies, 
therefore, remain not only compatible with divine humility, but they provide important 
scientific insights regarding the ultimate structure of reality which may indicate something of 
the ontological consequences of God’s humility.  
CHALLENGES FOR NATURAL TELEOLOGICAL ESCHATOLOGY 
A teleological conception of nature provides ample conceptual space for conceiving creation 
as a whole in eschatological terms. The natural world, it seems, is evolving toward greater 
complexity and increased interrelatedness among biological phenomena. However, despite 
the possibilities that such an updated teleology brings to theological construction, it should 
not lead to naive optimism. Indeed, construing eschatology through natural teleology can lead 
to theological tensions and invite philosophical problems, some of which I will explore 
further below. First, I will point out some general problems for construing eschatology in 
evolutionary teleological terms. Thereafter, I will focus on some theological and 
philosophical problems that seem to increase in strength, should one wish to take a 
teleological construal of eschatology in a non-interventionist direction.   
Nicholas Adams notices the problems of uncritically transferring ‘general’ or ‘secular’ 
eschatologies into the domain of Christian theology.51 Adams shows through the 
eschatologies of Pannenberg, Moltmann and Rahner how secular forms of reasoning ‘find 
their way not only into the peripheral language of Christian eschatology but often determine 
its very core.’52 One source of tension is that the notion of ‘time’ acquires different meaning 
in secular eschatologies when compared to Christian eschatology. The former conceptualizes 
time without any reference to God; ‘Christian eschatology, by contrast, means 
acknowledging that time is what God creates, redeems and sustains.’53 Adams’ motivation, it 
should be pointed out, ‘is not a variant of fundamentalism which seeks to isolate Christian 
speech from other kinds of discourse.’54 Neither is it mine. Rather, it is a call for caution 
regarding the interdisciplinary project of synthesizing secular accounts of directedness and 
teleology with that of Christian eschatology. We should proceed in a cautionary manner, in a 
way that respects both secular sources of knowledge and the uniqueness and particularity of 
the Christian faith. 
I will now turn to a few possible areas of tension and issues for further inquiry.  How should 
we understand the relationship between evolutionary progress and the eschatological 
transformation of this creation? On an evolutionary teleology, the transformational aspects of 
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nature are progressive, happening step by step. Biological history is crucial, and whatever 
happens is dependent on previous stages and phases of evolution. In many ways, the future 
emergence of biological phenomena is partly constrained by the total set of structural 
histories. In philosophy of emergence, scholars debate the relationship between two key-
concepts: supervenience and novelty. The anti-reductionist seeks to uphold two ontological 
assertions. On the one hand, emergent biological phenomenon X must supervene on the 
physical, meaning that X and X’s causal powers are ontologically dependent on the base level 
from which it emerged.55 On the other hand, in order to retain the irreducible character of X, 
it must exhibit novel capacities or powers (something which cannot be reduced to any of X’s 
constituent parts). It is debatable whether it is possible to hold these two ideas together, 
without one undermining the other; too much supervenience cancels out novelty and too 
much novelty breaks the relationship of dependency between the physical and emergent 
phenomena.56 This problem parallels, to some degree, the eschatological attempt at finding 
the correct balance between continuity and discontinuity of the old and new creation. It is 
contestable if evolutionary categories can lend sufficient ontological resources for framing 
the newness of the New Creation given that evolutionary becoming is dependent on previous 
biological structures. The future, on an evolutionary view, is very much ontologically 
constrained by the past. Hans Schwarz raises a similar point when he writes, ‘Evolutionary 
concepts imply a continuous expansion and perhaps improvement of existing possibilities. 
Yet evolution allows for nothing genuinely new. We only encounter new arrangements of 
what we face now. The vision of a new world, however, goes beyond the possibilities and 
opts for something radically new.’57 A potential problem could be that evolutionary 
continuity comes at the expense of discontinuity and the form of ontological novelty required 
for a robust theological account of the New Creation.58   
Another area in need of further clarification pertains to the relationship between goals within 
nature and goals for nature. We see in the sketched three accounts of natural teleology how 
nature is construed in purposeful terms through self-organizational processes and convergent 
principles; how, as Deacon puts it, ‘matter began to matter’. Goal-directedness can be seen as 
part and parcel of the natural order. However, on an eschatological reading of nature there are 
not just goals within nature. There is also an end-goal to nature’s becoming, which is God’s 
full indwelling in the New Creation. The consummation of creation, as portrayed in 
Revelation 21:3, means that ‘It is no longer merely heaven that is named as the place where 
God dwells; heaven and earth are now to be newly created so that God himself dwell in them. 
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. .’59 God will finally be all in all (1 Cor 15: 28). The eschata signifies not merely a 
transformative event within the boundaries of time, but it requires ‘the consummation or at 
least transformation of the categories of time, space, and matter, or the world as we know 
it.’60 It seems as if biology is silent on the issue of end-goals, and some consider the 
explanatory scope of the biological sciences as restricted to talking about proximate causes, 
not ultimate ones.61 Thus, when we talk about possible teleological aspects of nature, we 
need to conceptually clarify what kind of telos we are introducing into the discussion. This 
issue was raised by Ernst Mayr who wrote, ‘for the evolutionary biologist there is a great 
difference between telos as goal and telos as endpoint. If one asks whether natural selection, 
and more broadly, all processes in evolution have a telos, one must be clear which telos one 
has in mind.’62 The tricky issue, here, is how to extend a natural teleological framework, 
which focuses on biological trends and tendencies in nature, to the theological domain which 
emphasises the ultimate consummation of creation. Any successful synthesis of natural 
teleology with eschatology would have to concede the subordination of particular goals for 
individual biological phenomena to the overarching goal of the renovatio of creation. On this 
view, ‘the ultimate biological end of any such organism would be subordinate, within a 
broader framework, to further ends of a different sort, having to do with the teleological 
process of evolution by natural selection, leading to the fulfilment of the divine goal.’63 
Indeed, ‘the good’ for biological organisms – whereby S’s natural ends are intrinsically good 
for S – would in some sense have to be subordinate to the goodness-maximization of the 
eschatological process as a whole.64  
At this point, another issue emerges. If it is the case that teleological phenomena are made 
physically manifest because of God’s providential plan for creation, then does this not rule 
out intrinsic teleology? Intrinsic teleology, following Simon Oliver, ‘refers to a goal-
orientated behaviour which belongs to something by virtue of what it is.’65 Human artefacts, 
however, such as cars or vacuum cleaners, while they exhibit some form of end-directedness, 
owe their teleology to an outside source. Extrinsic teleology, therefore, ‘refers to an entity 
which is essentially inert or passive and which has teleological orientation imposed from 
without.’66 The danger is that an extrinsically grounded teleology in the eschatological 
intention of God would render biological teleology epiphenomenal.67 To put it directly, God 
would be doing all the causal labour. This sort of teleology would turn into Mayr’s 
teleonomy. I believe this tension to be real but not unsolvable.  
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It is helpful here to consider Moltmann’s pneumatological articulation of God’s ongoing 
presence in creation based on Yahweh’s ruach (Gen 1:2, Ps 33:6, Eccles 12:7; 3:21). As 
Moltmann explains, when ruach is mentioned ‘a distinction is often made between God’s 
own creative power to give life, and the created ability to live enjoyed by all the living.’68 
Drawing together Yahweh’s ruach (breath) and dabar (word), Moltmann further suggests 
that ‘If this unity of breath and voice is carried over to God’s creative activity, then all things 
are called to life through God’s Spirit and his Word.’69 Moltmann’s distinction is very 
important and helpful, as God can be seen as the ontological foundation of a ‘created ability’, 
without overriding the teleological striving of biological organisms. Such a distinction is 
possible, because while we maintain that God is actively present in all things, ‘this does not 
mean making God the same as everything else.’70 While God’s ruach, as manifested in 
intrinsic and efficacious teleological behaviour, has a ‘transcendent origin’, the ‘power to live 
enjoyed by everything that is alive is its immanent side.’71 Thus, as I argued above, biological 
teleology provides resources for framing divine immanence. It seems fully possible to hold 
together extrinsic and intrinsic teleology, without the former cancelling out the latter. 
Moreover, in holding together intrinsic and extrinsic teleology one can bypass the conclusion 
that an affirmation of biological teleology amounts to a design-argument for the existence of 
God. Alister McGrath explains this nicely, ‘Teleology must be distinguished from design, 
despite the frequent conflation in popular writings. Design is to be understood as conscious 
intent and artifice applied externally to the order of nature, in order to achieve some end or 
external goal. . .’72 Conversely, teleology indicates an intrinsic aspect of biological 
organisms.  
This paper will now proceed with a final discussion. The reality of biological teleology can 
properly be construed as a consequence of God’s eschatological presence and activity. 
Finding ways of linking up natural phenomena and occurrences to divine intentionality is 
nothing new but have preoccupied and still preoccupies a number of theologians and 
philosophers. One such area is the so called ‘divine action project’ (DAP)73, and within it the 
number of science-religion scholars that have devised strategies for accounting for God’s 
action in a non-interventionist manner. I want to sketch a couple of reasons for why a) my 
proposal is not a non-interventionist contribution to DAP, and how b) a robust eschatology 
significantly shapes and challenges some presuppositions within DAP.  
Those who endorse a non-interventionist route for the God-World relationship typically make 
the following kind of statements: ‘The processes revealed by the sciences are in themselves 
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God acting as creator, and God is not to be found as some kind of additional influence or 
factor added on to the processes of the world God is creating’74, ‘natural processes in the 
world be regarded as such as God’s creative action’75, ‘the world’s most fundamental causal 
principles are never interrupted’76, implying that ‘there would be no qualitative or ontological 
difference between the regularity of natural law conceived as expressing the regular or 
repetitive operation of divine agency and the intentionality of special divine actions.’77 These 
statements entail that whatever God brings about in reality is done solely through natural 
processes, and there is no ontological distinction to be made between divine intention and 
physical causation. To differentiate between the two (according to these scholars) is to open 
wide the door for a problematic dualism and supernatural causation. This means that God, in 
order to achieve a certain outcome, has to exert influence from outside of creation, hence 
suspending or breaking natural laws. The ambition of DAP is to hold together God’s 
transcendence and immanence by negating the ontological difference between God’s actions 
and the physical processes studied by natural science. I would suggest, in contrast to the 
many supporters of DAP, that such a non-interventionism runs into a severe causal problem. 
First of all, if one completely collapses the distinction between divine intentionality, call it G, 
and physical causation or processes, call this P, then God-talk becomes superfluous. That is, 
if an explanation of an effect E through G is identical to P, then there is no longer any reason 
to interpret E as instance of divine action, G.78 Based on epistemic simplicity, one could 
argue that G should be left out.79 P (causal processes that science describes) alone could be 
seen as sufficient. Secondly, and this is connected to the first point, the idea of attributing two 
causes for one single event amounts to philosophical incoherence. This point has been 
carefully articulated by philosopher Jaegwon Kim through the ‘causal exclusion 
principle/argument’. I will provide a quite lengthy quote so as to highlight the conundrum of 
positing two causes for one event. 
‘First, suppose that we trace the causal chain back from my bodily motion – to simplify, the 
movement of my left foot as I take my first step toward the kitchen. I assume we have a 
pretty good neurophysiological story to tell about how such limb motion occurs, a story 
involving transmission of neural signals, contraction of a group of muscles, and so on; let us 
suppose that the story ends with some neural event in my central nervous system, presumably 
the firing of a group of neural fibers somewhere deep in my brain. There seems every reason 
to think that such a neurophysiological causal explanation also exists; at least, we cannot rule 
out such a possibility. What then is the relationship between this explanation and the 
intentional explanation in terms of my belief and desire? One invokes a neural state, N, as a 
cause of my foot movement; the other invokes my desire for a drink of water, as a cause of 
the very same event. How are these two causes related to each other?’80  
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The problem, as Kim goes on to argue, is that by stating the presence of two causal stories for 
E, each claiming to offer a complete account of E, one creates an unstable situation which 
demands an explanation for how it is that the origin of E is to be accounted for in terms of 
two different causes.81 Similarly for the type of non-interventionism now discussed, one 
needs to demonstrate how it is that G and P both account for a single explanandum, without P 
undermining G or vice versa.  
The non-interventionist project of minimizing or completely rejecting any ontological 
difference between God’s active presence and physical causation leads, therefore, to 
troubling implications for our causal picture. Thus, I want to suggest that while God’s 
eschatological transformation can be seen as mediated through biological teleology, there 
remains a qualitative difference between such teleological processes and divine influence. 
But, doesn’t this ontological distinction lead to a problematic picture of God exerting external 
influence and thereby upsetting the harmony of physical reality? Our non-interventionist 
friends certainly think it does.  
What kind of assumptions give rise to this problem, and what view of nature is it that creates 
the demand for non-interventionist solutions?82 One common assumption within DAP is that 
the universe is a causally closed system. Hence, if God acts externally with regard to the 
physical then the laws of nature will have to give. In a way, God stands in competition to the 
universe. Such a causal closure principle is usually defined in the following ways: ‘every 
event has a sufficient physical cause’, ‘if you trace back an event to its cause you never have 
to leave the physical domain’, ‘If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause 
at t.’83 Needless to say, the causal closure principle comes in many forms and while its 
general claim is easy to understand, it is rather difficult to find a sufficient definition for it.84  
Not only is it very difficult to define the thesis of causal closure, but from a Christian 
standpoint such a metaphysical principle seems unjustifiable and question-begging.85 This is 
not to adopt fideism, as Lydia Jaeger points out. It is simply to stress the basic theological 
conviction of God as creator: ‘If God is the Creator of the universe, his action in it is not a 
problem to be figured out, but a reality to be acknowledged and the very foundation of 
whatever we can say about the world.’86 Jaeger, thus, poses a theological challenge to a core-
assumption (which led to the idea of nature resisting divine influence) within DAP. 
An eschatological appreciation of nature dissolves the dichotomy between God and World, 
and bypasses the causal-closure principle that has necessitated non-interventionist theologies. 
14 
 
Nature, viewed in light of eschatology and the redemptive history of humanity and cosmos, is 
not a ‘closed system, perfect in itself and totally self-sufficient.’87 The notion of God bringing 
about a new creation indicates strongly that God is not excluded from or limited by the 
processes and structures of this world. I would further argue that an eschatological 
understanding of nature makes biological teleology plausible, and far from an ontological 
anomaly to be explained away in terms of mechanistic causation. Moreover, the Parousia 
(Matthew 24:3, 27, 37, 39; 1 Thessalonians 4:13-5.11; 1 Corinthians 15:23, 2 Peter 3:10-13), 
indicates nature as an ongoing process that will transition into a new creation. As David 
Wilkinson notes, ‘the Parousia is a reminder that the world is not a closed system.’88 Creation 
is profoundly teleological and points to a future where ‘there shall be no more death, neither 
sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed 
away’ (Revelation 21:4). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has evaluated the promises and challenges of framing Christian eschatology 
through natural (biological) teleology. It has been noted that a constructive engagement with 
teleology carries benefits for our understanding of the role of the Spirit in the coming of the 
New Creation, theistic evolution, and also for the notion of God’s humility. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be seen if natural teleology, evolutionarily construed, can lend sufficient 
ontological resources for upholding the idea of a New Creation. It was also argued that more 
work needs to be done on the issue of bridging teleological goals within nature and the 
eschatological end-goal for physical reality as a whole. I suggested that the attempt to 
synthesise eschatology and natural teleology should not be construed as a form of non-
interventionism, but that an eschatological account of creation challenges non-interventionist 
assumptions regarding God’s action. 
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